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The purpose of the paper is to discuss Japanese relations with the Indochina Sub-region and the
countries in it. The author starts with a brief overview on the sub-region’s historical background, and
then discusses Japan’s historical experiences during the Cold War and post-Cold War periods, as well
as the current situation, especially in terms of Japan’s ODA policy and her competition with China in
various initiatives for sub-regional cooperation. The author ﬁnally refers to some implications for the
future development of Japan’s relations with this sub-region.
Introduction
Indochina, in the broader deﬁnition, includes ﬁve mainland Southeast Asian na-
tions, namely Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. This sub-region, also
known as continental Southeast Asia, is surrounded by the China Continent, India
Sub-continent, Bay of Bengal, Andaman Sea, Gulf of Siam and South China Sea.1 Partly
owing to its geographical location, the sub-region had long been a stage for conﬂicts and
wars. It was only after the end of the Cambodian Conﬂict that the sub-region was able
to enter into a new stage of peace and cooperation.
Though Japan is located several thousand kilometers from the Indochina sub-
region, she is one of the major countries which have been deeply involved in the
changing situation of this sub-region, especially since the Asia-Paciﬁc War period. This
involvement continues to this day and will most likely continue into the future.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss Japanese relations with the Indochina
Sur-region and the countries in it. Following a brief overview on the sub-region’s
historical background in Section 1, the Second Section discusses historical experiences
of Japan in Cold War and Post-Cold War periods. Section 3 examines the current
situation, especially in terms of Japan’s ODA policy, and Section 4 covers her competi-
tion with China in various initiatives for sub-regional cooperation. The paper ﬁnally
refers to some implications for the future development of Japan’s relations toward the
sub-region.
1. Historical Background of the Nations in the Indochina Sub-Region
(1) Cold War Period
One of the most important aspects in the modern history of Indochina or continen-
tal Southeast Asia is the fact that all of the nations with the exception of Thailand were
under Western colonial domination during the 19th and early 20th century and only
gained independence in the mid 20th century.
For many years after the end of World War II, three former French colonies:
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, su#ered from prolonged conﬂicts and wars. Furthermore,
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these three countries experienced the socialist system of the command economy and
isolated themselves from the capitalist world. In the case of northern Vietnam, this
lasted for 3 decades. As for southern Vietnam, and her neighboring countries, Laos and
Cambodia, this economic system lasted for more than a decade.
In the meantime, Burma (now called Myanmar) too adopted a socialist type of
command economy in the early 1960s. She also applied a seclusionist-type neutralism
in order to stay away from the Cold War conﬂict, especially from the war ﬁres occurring
in the adjacent areas. Having said that, the country was not immune to conﬂict, being
domestically divided by armed rebellions of ethnic groups, and maintaining only a
nominal form of her federal system.
Thailand on the other hand survived the colonial period as an independent king-
dom and held a pro-US and anti-communist posture during the Cold War period. She in
fact became a member of SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization) in 1954 when it
was established under a strong US initiative. During the Vietnam War period, she not
only let the United States use her military bases in the country, but also sent a small
contingent of soldiers to South Vietnam. At the same time, Thailand was very sensitive
to possible support by China and North Vietnam toward communist rebels who were
based mostly in the northeastern part of the country.2
The sub-regional balance of power however made a signiﬁcant change during the
Cambodian Conﬂict which broke out in late 1978. Thailand closely cooperated with
communist China to support the anti-Hanoi Cambodian groups, while confronting
Vietnam, Laos, and the Phnom Penh government of Cambodia.3
Thus for a long time Thailand was deeply involved in the conﬂicts of her neighbors.
Nevertheless, she also enjoyed a reputation of being the only country in continental
Southeast Asia whose society was rather stable despite occasional military intervention
into politics. This reputation together with her policy of opening doors to the capitalist
world enabled the country to enhance economic relations with developed countries,
especially after the 1985 Plaza accord which led to the increasing appreciation of the
Japanese yen.4 Thailand was also a founding member of ASEAN (Association of
Southeast Asian Nations) which started in 1967.
China, the northern gigantic neighbor of Indochina, supported anti-imperialist and
revolutionary forces including Vietnamese in the sub-region during the early years of
the Cold War. Therefore, her relations with anti-communist ASEAN members remained
rather weak, and came almost to a standstill during the turmoil of the Cultural
Revolution. By the late 1970s, however, her relations with Thailand as well as the
United States and Japan improved remarkably thanks to her new policy of economic
reform and opening doors and their common position against the Soviet Union and her
ally, Vietnam.5
In brief, Thailand as an ASEAN member enjoyed rapid economic growth, whereas
progress in other countries in continental Southeast Asia experienced stagnation due to
successive conﬂicts and a stumbling command economy.
(2) Post-Cold War Era
Nonetheless, the situation dramatically changed in the late 1980s and increased its
momentum in the early 1990s. Laos and Vietnam launched a new policy of economic
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reform and began opening their doors in 1986. Burma followed them in 1988, shortly
after the military coup. Cambodia restored her monarchy in 1993 after a 2-year rule by
UNTAC (UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia). Together with a series of changes in
policy orientation by the respective countries, the 1991 conclusion of the Paris Peace
Agreement on Cambodia and the rapprochement between China and Vietnam in the
same year opened a new page in the history of the sub-region and Southeast Asia.
ASEAN began to expand by admitting new members: Vietnam in 1995, Laos and
Myanmar in 1997 and ﬁnally Cambodia in 1999. The ASEAN enlargement was nothing
more than a process where a regional grouping, which had initially consisted of
predominantly insular Southeast Asian members, absorbed continental Southeast
Asian countries one by one.6
The realization of ASEAN 10 however brought about a new problem, which is
sometimes known as the ASEAN divide issues.7 The ASEAN new members, often
categorized as the CLMV countries, were poorly equipped with infrastructures and
industrial facilities, and lacked adequate systems, regulations and human resources
necessary for managing a market economy and external relations. This led to a serious
gap between the new-entrants and the ASEAN forerunners in various aspects. Reduc-
ing this gap became a crucial challenge for both the new and old members, because
without it a real regional integration could not be successfully accomplished.
Facing this new challenge, international organizations as well as regional and
extra-regional governments took the initiative to establish forums, taskforces and
mechanisms to promote regional and sub-regional cooperation. Thus during the mid-
1990s, various frameworks were born almost simultaneously, such as the GMS (Greater
Mekong Sub-region) Development Cooperation, the Forum for Comprehensive Develop-
ment of Indochina (FCDI), the Mekong River Commission (MRC), the Working Group for
Economic Cooperation in Indochina and the ASEAN Mekong Basin Development Coop-
eration (AMBDC).8 The frameworks often overlapped with each other in terms of
mandate, purpose and activities and subsequently brought about the “Mekong conges-
tion”.9 However, their synchronized appearance also indicated the fact that the interna-
tional society was increasingly concerned about the future of the sub-region.
The importance and urgency of the above-mentioned challenges were further
aggravated by the outbreak of the ﬁnancial crisis in East Asia in 1997. Enlarged
ASEAN, now embracing the economically less developed countries of Indochina, had to
face an even more formidable task of accelerating economic integration and enhancing
competitiveness in the whole region, while narrowing the gap between the old and new
members.
It merits attention however that the ﬁnancial crisis also gave a new impetus for
both Southeast and Northeast Asian nations to launch an ambitious attempt to enlarge
regionalism in East Asia. ASEAN members and three Northeast Asian counterparts,
Japan, China and South Korea now came to realize that they belonged to a single region
with a common fate and a mutual dependency based upon the de facto formation of
closely knitted business networks. They quickly institutionalized the ASEAN3
dialogue mechanism. Furthermore, as an extension of it, the annual East Asia Summit
began in 2005, which includes not only ASEAN plus three (APT) countries but India,
Australia and New Zealand as well.
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The rapid development of these regional and mega-regional attempts has provided
a new important meaning to the Indochina sub-region. Looking back at the history of
the sub-region, the majority of nations in it had been practically excluded from the East
Asian regional networking of inter-dependency, mainly due to the prolonged conﬂicts
and wars, their isolationist and often antagonistic policy toward their neighbors, and
their strict application of the command economy. What is worse, the countries within
the sub-region and even the people inside a nation themselves had been physically and
psychologically separated from each other.
Although the Indochina sub-region is surrounded by continental China, insular
Southeast Asia and sub-continental India and thus geographically occupies a highly
strategic position in the heart of East Asia, it has long been the missing link to the
regional networks of East Asia. The missing link should now be reconnected to become
meaningful cross-roads.10
It is true that during the 1997-98 Financial Crisis, the existing regional and
sub-regional frameworks that fostered Indochina’s development and cooperation were
largely inactive. But some of them became revitalized at the turn of the millennium.
And furthermore, many other projects were newly born, aiming to help the sub-region’s
socio-economic and human resource development. These include the Initiative for
ASEAN Integration (IAI), the AEM-METI Economic and Industrial Cooperation Com-
mittee (AMEICC), and the Aeyawadi-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strat-
egy (ACMECS). The GMS Development Cooperation initiated by ADB (Asian Develop-
ment Bank) also proposed an ambitious plan to create economic corridors in the
sub-region.11
It should be noted, however, that the rapid development of East Asia regionalism
and Indochina sub-regional cooperation has also provoked rivalry and competition
among concerned governments and organizations, most typically between Japan and
China, as will be discussed later.
2. Japan with the Indochina Sub-Region
(1) Early Years of Cold War
During the 1940s, Japan waged a self-destructing war with the ambition to create
the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere”, but was defeated and then occupied by
the Allied countries. It was only in 1951 with the San Francisco Peace Treaty (validated
in the following year) that Japan regained her legal status as an independent nation,
paving her return to the international society.
The peace treaty however was the outcome of a US Asia-Paciﬁc strategic plan
which was articulated under regional circumstances that included events such as the
communist victory in China (1949) and the outbreak of the Korea War (1950). As a
matter of fact, though the People’s Republic of China and the Ho Chi Minh government
of Vietnam were not invited to the San Francisco peace conference, the Kingdoms of
Laos and Cambodia and the Bao Dai government of Vietnam, all of which were
recognized by Western countries as independent nations within the French Union, as
well as Thailand, were invited and became signatories of the peace treaty. Japan was
thus able to restore o$cial relations with those countries in the Indochina sub-region.
She also reestablished diplomatic relations, through a bilateral peace treaty, with Burma
Masaya Shiraishi
 16 
which had refused to join the San Francisco peace conference.
While normalizing relations with the sub-regional countries, Japan also paid war
reparations to Burma and South Vietnam (successor of the Bao Dai government) and aid
equivalent to it (what is called quasi-reparations) to Laos and Cambodia, which sponta-
neously relinquished the right of war reparations. As for Thailand, which had not been
“occupied” by the Japanese military and therefore did not have the right to claim war
reparations, Japan instead provided her with compensation to liquidate inconvertible
special yen which the Tokyo government had owed to Bangkok during the Asia-Paciﬁc
War.
In this way, Japan paved the way for the future development of diplomatic and
economic relations with anti-communist countries in the Indochina sub-region. But she
o$cially ignored the very existence of Ho Chi Minh’s socialist government in the
northern half of Vietnam. This policy adopted by the Japanese government reﬂected
her intention to follow the US regional policy. Washington expected that Japan would
realize an economic recovery followed by development through the establishment of
close relations with non-communist countries in the Asia-Paciﬁc and with very limited
business relations with communist North Vietnam and China.
This basic stance of the Tokyo government did not largely change during the
1960s, when Japan was becoming an economically strong power. For instance, Japan
showed a strong initiative to create ADB (Asian Development Bank) and Ministerial
Conference for the Economic Development of Southeast Asia. Both of them were
o$cially established in 1966. Socialist countries in Asia-Paciﬁc ware practically
excluded from those institutions. Furthermore, for the case of ADB, Japan as well as the
United Sates became the biggest ﬁnancier, thus demonstrating her will to help the
economic development of non-communist nations in the region by collaboration with
other developed countries in the Asia-Paciﬁc. The same logic was well demonstrated in
1973 when Japan successfully invited Australia and New Zealand to join the Ministerial
Conference.
Furthermore, as the Vietnam War escalated in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the
Tokyo government supported Washington’s policy by allowing Americans to use the
military bases in the country to serve for their war e#orts. Japan also positively
responded to US requests for burden sharing, by increasing economic assistance to
South Vietnam and non-communist Asian countries surrounding it.12
(2) Later Years of the Cold War
Generally speaking, Japan’s regional policy since her return to the international
society in 1952 had been largely shaped within the framework of US strategy. Japan
had been more or less satisﬁed with this basic arrangement so as to pursue her own
national interests, while receiving US support and encouragement.
Nevertheless, a tremendous shock hit Japan in 1971, when the Nixon administra-
tion suddenly announced the rapprochement with Beijing. The Nixon shock was a
crucial turning point and the Tokyo government launched diplomatic e#orts to normal-
ize relations with socialist countries in Asia: China and Mongolia in 1972 and North
Vietnam in 1973.
These e#orts have been often called “independent diplomacy”. However, as far as
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her contacts with North Vietnam were concerned, Japan’s rather prudent approach
towards the country did not deviate far from Tokyo’s earlier policy of working within
the framework of US policy. Japan signed an agreement to normalize diplomatic
relations with the Hanoi government in September 1973, only eight months after the
conclusion of the Paris peace agreement between the United States and North Vietnam.
The Tokyo government signed agreements with its Hanoi counterpart in order to
mutually open embassies and provide economic aid (which was tacitly understood as
equivalent to Japan’s reparations of the Asia-Paciﬁc War) in October 1975, just half a
year after the fall of Saigon.13
Even so, it is also noteworthy that Japan’s relationship vis-a◊-vis Hanoi went further
than Washington’s diplomatic e#orts. The United States refused to provide Hanoi with
aid, which, according to the latter, was promised at the peace talks in Paris. The United
States did reject Hanoi’s claim though, based on the reasoning that Hanoi had violated
the 1973 Paris peace agreement by using her armed forces to liberate the South.
Furthermore, the United States continued to embargo Vietnam, extending its target
area from the northern half to the rest of the country.
It is true that the possibility for improved relations arose between Washington and
Hanoi during the Carter administration. The bilateral talks for the normalization of
relations started in 1977, which enabled reuniﬁed Vietnam to become the 149th member
of United Nations in the same year. But the United States ﬁnally suspended its talks
with Hanoi by the end of 1978. As Sino-Vietnam relations deteriorated, Washington
decided to choose Beijing and established diplomatic relations with China in January
1979.14
In the meantime, Japanese leaders often tried acting as an intermediary to revive
stagnated contacts between Washington D.C. and Hanoi. As Guy Faure and Lauernt
Schwab have put it,15 “bridge diplomacy” was the Tokyo government’s ability to use her
diplomatic ties with both countries, to play an intermediary role between them.
Another indicative expression of Tokyo’s willingness to engage in bridge diplo-
macy is found in the 1977 Manila speech delivered by Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda. In
the speech which has been later called the Fukuda Doctrine, he emphasized three pillars
of Japan’s diplomacy toward Southeast Asia: one, she would never become a military
super power, second, she would develop multi-faceted and heart-to-heart relations with
ASEAN partners, and third, she would contribute to peace and prosperity in the entire
region of Southeast Asia by supporting ASEAN’s e#orts for solidarity and resilience
and at the same time cultivating good relations of mutual understanding with three
socialist countries in Indochina.
The third pillar was the expression of Japan’s readiness to act as a bridge between
5 ASEAN and 3 Indochinese countries. And this was especially aimed at dispelling the
widely existing notion among ASEAN leaders that Japan had a hidden agenda in her
provision of aid to socialist countries in Indochina. Prime Minister Fukuda wanted to
express good will and foster Japan’s image as an honest broker.16
However, the outbreak of the Cambodian Conﬂict in 1978 hampered Japan’s aspira-
tion. She was forced to align herself with ASEAN and China and stand against
pro-Soviet Vietnam and her sponsored Cambodian government in Phnom Penh. As a
matter of fact, the Tokyo government froze her promised aid to Hanoi after the latter
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sent soldiers to Cambodia in late 1978 and formally suspended aid after the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979. Thus, Japan’s relations with three socialist
regimes in Indochina were stagnated during the “New Cold War” period, even though
she tried to keep open her dialogue channels with those countries as much as possible.
One such e#ort was reﬂected in the resumption of small-scale humanitarian aid to Hanoi
in 1982. In the meantime, the Tokyo government continued aid (grants and technical
assistance) for Laos, even though its amount was rather small.
Nonetheless, Japan did not have much leeway in acting freely vis-a◊-vis Indochina.
This was well illustrated by the fact that ASEAN members, especially Thailand and
Singapore, as well as the United States Congress, openly raised voices against Japan,
when some Japanese enterprises began to intensify business activities with Vietnam,
shortly after Hanoi’s declaration of the Doi Moi policy in late 1986. At this point, the
Japanese recognized that they had to wait for a more opportune time in order to break
through the stalemate and improve relations with Indochina’s socialist countries.17
(3) Cambodian Peace
In the late 1980s, several signs indicated a new development toward reconciliation
in the Indochina sub-region. An informal meeting for Cambodian peace, hosted by
Indonesia that included the Cambodian contesting forces and Vietnam, was ﬁrst held in
Jakarta in July 1988. Soon after, Thai Premier Chartchai Choonhavan announced a new
policy to transform Indochina from a battle ﬁeld to a market place. As a matter of fact,
Thailand, as a “frontline state”, which had initially taken a hawkish attitude toward
Vietnam and her sponsored Phnom Penh government, was now beginning to show a
reconciliatory posture toward them and even acted as a mediator among the contesting
parties of the Cambodian Conﬂict.
When the international conference on Cambodia, which was a more comprehensive
mechanism for peace, started in Paris in July 1989, Japan was invited as a member. In
October 1990, the Japanese government contributed to the peace process by hosting the
Tokyo meeting for the four Cambodian parties. Japan became one of the signatories of
the Paris Peace Agreement on Cambodia in October 1991. This was the ﬁrst occasion
since the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty for post-war Japan to participate in an
international peace conference and sign a mulitilateral peace agreement.18
When the UN transitional administration started in Cambodia, the Tokyo govern-
ment sent its self-defense forces there in September 1992 to contribute to the UN- led
peace keeping operation (PKO). This was the ﬁrst occasion for post-war Japan to
dispatch her land forces abroad, even though a year earlier she had sent her naval forces
(mine sweepers) to the Persian Gulf.
Prior to this, Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu made a speech in Singapore in May 1991,
in which he announced Tokyo’s willingness to host an international conference for the
economic recovery of Cambodia. In actuality, the Ministerial Meeting on Reconstruction
of Cambodia was held in Tokyo in June 1992.19
Japan also took up a very positive attitude toward Vietnam. In November 1992, she
resumed o$cial development aid (yen loan) to the Hanoi government. Furthermore, the
Japanese and French governments cooperated with one another to lead the successful
holding of the ﬁrst Vietnam Consultative Group (CG) Meeting in Paris in November
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1993. Incidentally, the US government had expressed its new policy to allow interna-
tional organizations’ resumption of ﬁnancing to Vietnam in July 1993. Following this
move, Washington ﬁnally lifted an embargo against Vietnam in February 1994 and
normalized diplomatic relations in August 1995.20
In January 1993, Premier Kiichi Miyazawa made a speech in Bangkok, where he
proposed the establishment of the Forum for Comprehensive Development of Indochina
(FCDI). Its preparatory meeting at a senior o$cial level took place in Tokyo at the end
of the same year, and the ministerial meeting in Tokyo in February 1995. The purpose
of the Forum was to attract international attention in support of the economic recovery
of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. The United States only sent observers, avoiding full
involvement in this Japanese e#ort, which demonstrated her rather reserved attitude
toward three Indochinese countries.21
The Japanese Ministry of Foreign A#airs itself also gradually lost eagerness in
sustaining the FCDI and instead paid more attention in involving itself with other
frameworks to help the CLMV countries’ socio-economic development and Greater
Mekong sub-regional cooperation. This suggested the fact that the 1977 Fukuda
Doctrine’s key principle was losing its applicability vis-a◊-vis the rapidly changing
situation in Southeast Asia. The third pillar of the Doctrine had been based on the
premise that Southeast Asia was divided into two di#erent, if not antagonistic, camps
and therefore Japan could and should play a bridging role between them. Nevertheless,
the actual development in the region was moving at a much faster pace than what the
Japanese leaders had anticipated. The enlargement process of ASEAN had already
started by the time the FCDI ministerial meeting was held.22
(4) ASEAN Enlargement
The ASEAN enlargement was the main locomotive behind the structural change of
the regional balance of power in Southeast Asia after Cambodia regained peace.
The ﬁrst Japanese e#ort to catch up with this new development was to help the
CLMV countries join ASEAN itself. And in the next stage, as the CLMV countries one
after another became ASEAN members, Japan tried helping them to narrow their gap
with the ASEAN forerunners (ASEAN divide issues) and consequently contributing to
the process of ASEAN integration.
It was Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) rather than the Ministry
of Foreign A#airs that quickly started this kind of e#ort. When Economic Minister
Ryutaro Hashimoto (who would become Prime Minister two years later) met his
Southeast Asian counterparts at the third AEM-MITI in Chiang Mai in April 1994, they
agreed to establish the Working Group on Economic Cooperation in Indochina.
The Working Group ﬁrst met in Bangkok in March 1995. The main purpose of this
Working Group was to provide CLMV o$cials and specialists with opportunities of
training and workshops in order to obtain necessary knowledge and skills to become
ASEAN members and also to conduct joint research and studies for drafting develop-
ment plans in various industrial sectors.
This scheme fell into the category of triangular assistance from the Japanese point
of view: i.e. Japan would encourage and help the south-to-south cooperation between
and among developing countries. For instance, Japan would provide ﬁnancial and
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technical assistance to a Thai organizer of seminars that invited and trained govern-
ment o$cials and specialists from CLMV countries.
By 1997, however, the mandate of the Working Group had almost become outdated,
as Laos and Myanmar became regular ASEAN members following the suit of Vietnam.
Shortly after that, the ﬁnancial crisis broke out in Thailand and swiftly spread over the
whole region of East Asia. In order to cope with this changing situation, the sixth
AEM-MITI in Kuala Lumpur in October 1997 decided to replace the Working Group
within a new framework: ASEAN-MITI (later ASEAN-METI) Economic and Industrial
Cooperation Committee (AMEICC). The Committee ﬁrst met in Bangkok in November
1998. Its main function was to help the CLMV countries tackle the ASEAN divide
issues and also to enhance the competitiveness of ASEAN economies as a whole by
promoting regional integration and upgrading main industries not only in new ASEAN
members but the old members seriously hit by the ﬁnancial crisis as well.23
Meanwhile, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign A#airs also expressed its eagerness to
contribute to infrastructure building in GMS, especially EWEC and SEC, and support
regional and sub-regional cooperative frameworks such as IAI and ACMECS.
EWEC (East-West Economic Corridor) and SEC (Southern Economic Corridor) were
the projects proposed by the ADB and agreed upon by the 8th GMS ministerial confer-
ence in Manila in October 1998. The projects aimed to build and improve cross-border
transport infrastructures and communication and energy links from central Vietnam
through Laos and northeastern Thailand to eastern Myanmar and from southern
Vietnam through Cambodia to Thailand respectively. With the formation of such
corridors, the ﬂow of goods, people, information and energy across borders would be
facilitated between and among sub-regional countries, which had long been physically
and psychologically separated from each other. This creation of mutual connectivity
would eventually stimulate socio-economic development and reduce poverty in the
sub-region.24
The IAI (Initiative for ASEAN Integration) was ﬁrst proposed by Singaporean
Premier Goh Chok Tong and agreed upon by the Fourth ASEAN Informal Summit in
Singapore in November 2000, to narrow the development gap within ASEAN (as well as
between ASEAN and the other parts of the world) to foster better ASEAN integration.25
The ACMECS (Ayeyawadi-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy) was
the framework created under Thai Premier Thaksin Shinawatara’s initiative. Its
original members were Thailand and her neighboring countries, Myanmar, Laos and
Cambodia, but Vietnam later became the 5th member, thus the framework encompassed
all countries in continental Southeast Asia.26 IAI and ACMECS were typical frame-
works of south-to-south cooperation in which the founding members of ASEAN could
help the new comers.
The Tokyo government also expressed its willingness to help three Indochinese
countries’ plan: the “Development Triangle”. The idea was originally agreed upon at the
tripartite summit of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, which was held in Vientiane in
October 1999. This was the ﬁrst occasion since the Cambodian Peace where only the
three heads of state met together. The Development Triangle plan was aimed at,
through mutual cooperation between the three nations, eradicating poverty and stimu-
lating socio-economic development in the least developed areas of these countries,
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which were bordering provinces. This attempt also fell into the category of south-to-
south cooperation, but without the involvement of more developed members. It was
certain that Vietnam was ahead of the two in economic development and was therefore
in a position to provide limited scale of aid to her counterparts. But, at any rate, they
badly needed ﬁnancial and technical assistance by any third parties.27
When Premier Junichiro Koizumi visited Vientiane to attend the ASEAN3 sum-
mit in November 2004, the three prime ministers of Indochina met him and asked
Tokyo’s support for the Development Triangle plan.28 Since then, the Japanese assis-
tance to the plan has been rendered mainly through the GGS (Grant Assistance for
Grass-Roots Human Security Projects) and, more recently, JAIF (Japan ASEAN Integra-
tion Fund) schemes for basic human need (BHN) facilities such as local clinics, schools,
clean water supply systems and small roads.29
Thus, many of Japan’s recent assistance toward the Indochina sub-region have been
clearly oriented to gain a wider scope in promoting cross-border connectivity and
regional integration. At the same time, the triangular assistance scheme is often applied
to support multilateral cooperation and enhance mutual complementarity among the
sub-regional economies.
3. Japan’s ODA in the Indochina Sub-Region
In the history of Japan’s o$cial development assistance (ODA), the bilateral scheme
has been predominant: Japan provides a certain country with aid through bilateral
negotiation and agreement and with the anticipation that the aid will help socio-
economic development in the recipient country. Again in this regard, the Indochina
sub-region has become a testing-ground for Japan’s new and pioneering experiment
beyond the conventional bilateral scheme, which she had not seriously tried elsewhere.
Japan’s ODA is usually divided into two categories: bilateral and multilateral.
Multilateral aid is the scheme within which Japan provides a budget to international or
multi-governmental organizations. Bilateral aid on the other hand is the scheme where
Japan provides aid to a single recipient country on the basis of the two parties’
negotiation and agreement. And the most frequently used classiﬁcation of bilateral
assistance is based on the three types of payment: grants, yen loans, and technical
assistance.30
However, here, we apply another way of categorization. This is based upon the
three di#erent aims of assistance: for (1) hard infrastructure buildings mainly to
promote economic growth itself, (2) the improvement of social facilities and living
standards largely aimed to reduce poverty and narrow the socio-economic gap, and (3)
legal and institutional reforms, human resource development and capacity building.31
(1) Hard Infrastructure Projects
Among the hard infrastructure projects in which Japan has assisted in the Indo-
china sub-region, the projects aimed to enhance mutual connectivity along with the
GMS East-West Economic Corridor (EWEC) are the rehabilitation and upgrading of the
Da Nang sea port, the building of the Hai Van tunnel between Da Nang and Hue of
central Vietnam, the improvement and widening of the western portion of Route no. 9
in Laos, and the construction of the second Mekong international bridge between Laos
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and Thailand.
The improvement and widening of Cambodian Route no. 1 between Phnom Penh
and Neak Loeun, which is now undergoing construction, is the project along with the
GMS Southern Economic Corridor (SEC), or sometimes called by the Japanese as the
Second East-West Corridor. In addition, the Tokyo Government has expressed interest
in a project to construct the Neak Loeun bridge on Route no. 1 over the Mekong
mainstream. The building of the Thi Vay port near Hochiminh City is to serve as
another sea outlet than the existing Saigon port for the Southern Corridor.32
In brief, the Tokyo government has provided aid on a bilateral basis to almost all of
the above projects, the majority of which are in the form of yen loans but some in the
form of grants. Despite her bilateral arrangement in ODA payments, Japan is very much
concerned about their wider signiﬁcance in sub-regional development and cross-border
connectivity.
Among them, quite exceptional in terms of the payment scheme is the case of
the second Mekong international bridge which connects Savannakhet in Laos and
Mukdahan in Thailand over the Mekong mainstream. The Japan Bank for International
Cooperation (JBIC) provided yen loans to both Thailand and Laos, applying the same
favorable conditions in repayment, with which Japan usually would not bestow upon a
relatively developed country such as Thailand. At any rate, this is the ﬁrst occasion
ever in the history of JBIC where it gave loans to more than one country for a single
project.33
There were still many other ODA projects in places other than the East-West and
the Southern Corridors, which consequently improved cross-border development in the
sub-region, even though they were not in Japan’s original idea. For example, the
upgrading of National Route no. 5 in northern Vietnam between the country’s capital,
Hanoi and the major port city, Hai Phong, the rehabilitation and improvement of the Hai
Phong sea port, and the construction of the Bai Chay bridge in Ha Long on Route. no. 18
have all turned out to greatly improve connectivity between northern Vietnam and
southwestern China.34
The future construction projects of Vietnam’s north-south super highway and rapid
transit railway, in which Premier Shinzo Abe promised to his counterpart Nguyen Tan
Dung in a bilateral meeting in Tokyo in October 2006,35 also has virtually a big potential
to enhance connectivity between continental Southeast Asia and China. One can even
dream of travel by super express train from Singapore through Bangkok, Hochiminh
City and Hanoi northward to Beijing.
In summary, those transport infrastructure projects as well as thermo power and
other projects for which Japan has assisted to ASEAN new members do not only
contribute to the economic growth and competitiveness of each recipient country, but
also serves the purpose of helping her catch up with the more developed economies in
the region. Many of the transport projects have also actual and potential signiﬁcance in
physically connecting the recipient country with the rest of the sub-region and areas
beyond it.
The second category of Japanese bilateral assistance, which is to improve social
facilities and living standards, usually ﬁnanced in the form of grants, is also workable
for the promotion of sub-regional links and connectivity, as demonstrated in the case of
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the CLV Development Triangle plan. For instance, a provincial clinic in Vietnam, built
with Japanese ODA, will be able to serve not only the local inhabitants, but also the
people in southern Laos and northeastern Cambodia who travel across the border.
(2) Institutional Reforms and Capacity Building
The third category of Japanese aid, in the ﬁeld of legal and institutional reforms,
human resource development and capacity building, which is usually ﬁnanced through
grants and technical assistance, can also contribute to the CLMV’s e#orts to reduce the
development gap and encourage ASEAN integration through promoting conﬁdence-
building and mutual understanding among sub-regional countries and between new
and old ASEAN members.
Taking the case of legal and institutional reforms, Japan is helping the Indochina
countries undergoing transitional economies to promote the marketization process,
legal and tax reforms, among many others. In this respect, one illustrating example is
the Japan-Vietnam Joint Initiative to improve the latter’s investment environment.
This started with an agreement between Premiers Junichiro Koizumu and Phan Van
Khai in April 2003.36
The Initiative which is joined by Japanese business people as well as government
o$cials has now entered the third phase, following the successful achievements in the
ﬁrst and second phases. This is quite unique in the sense that the Japanese side points
out inadequacies in Vietnam’s legal and institutional frameworks and operating mecha-
nisms while working together with Vietnamese counterparts to ultimately list up
practical prescriptions for each sector. This entails the creation of new rules, the
alteration of existing regulations and the changes in the ways of conduct, which the
Vietnamese authorities, backed by Japanese ﬁnancial and technical assistance, should
realize. The implementation process is to be regularly monitored by the joint commit-
tee.
This kind of attempt has a shade of Japanese intervention in domestic politics and
internal a#airs of the recipient country. In this regard, it is again a rather bold pilot
experiment for Japan, whose traditional ODA policy has been based upon the principle
of non-interference.
In the ﬁeld of human resource development and capacity building, the Japanese
governmental and semi-governmental agencies have a variety of aid programs that
invite and train o$cials and specialists from CLMV countries, either separately on the
respective country basis or jointly on the sub-region-wide basis. They also send
Japanese experts to recipient countries to give advice and organize seminars, etc. The
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) has built a human resource develop-
ment center in major cities in the sub-region.37 These programs are intended to narrow
the gap in knowledge, skills and experiences between the new ASEAN members and the
rest of the region.
Furthermore, for the case where multi-national trainees from the sub-regional
countries are invited to Japan and put together in the same place, they are given a good
opportunity for mutual contacts and exchanges. The triangular support mechanism
can also be a good vehicle to encourage the process of mutual understandings not only
among the trainees but between the trainers of host countries such as Thailand and
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trainees from CLMV countries.
In the same vein, programs such as the Japanese Grant Aid for Human Resource
Development Scholarship (JDS) which have invited young talents from Asian countries
of transitional economies to study at a graduate-level in Japanese universities have been
quite successful.38 These young students encounter those from various countries in and
out of the Indochina sub-region as well as Japanese colleagues on the same campus.
In brief, through various programs in the third ODA category, Japan does not only
help with the catch-up e#orts of CLMV countries, but provides them with good
opportunities for direct human contacts and networking.
Japan also donates a part of her ODA budget to inter-governmental agencies such
as ADB (i.e. through a multilateral scheme) so that the latter can carry out multi-
national programs and projects covering a wider scope and involving multiple recipient
countries.39 As mentioned earlier, triangular assistance programs also have similar
merits.40
4. Japan and Indochina Facing the New Development of East Asia Regionalism
As mentioned in the above, with the 199798 ﬁnancial crisis as a crucial turning
point, a new wave of regionalism or mega-regionalism had spread in East Asia, which
includes both Southeast and Northeast Asian countries. One embarrassing problem in
this expansion is however the increasing rivalry and competition among concerned
parties. The most notable is the case between Japan and China who are competing for
the leadership role in making a new regional arrangement and especially in trying to
gain inﬂuence in Southeast Asian nations.
(1) Pan-Asianist and Pan-Paciﬁc Trends against the Historical Backdrop
Looking back at the history of Japan’s concerns toward the region, there was a
strong psychological attachment among many Japanese leaders and intellectuals to
Pan-Asianism from the Meiji period. This concept was generally based on the dichoto-
mous view of the world, divided between the invading Western powers and the
oppressed Asian nations. A sort of Pan-Asianism culminated, during the period of the
Asia-Paciﬁc War, in the Greater East Asia Summit which was held in Tokyo in
November 1943.41
By contrast, the idea of Pan-Paciﬁc cooperation was relatively new for the Japanese.
The ﬁrst outstanding instance was the creation of the Institute of Paciﬁc Relations in
1925, where Japanese intellectuals shared a spirit of friendship and harmony with their
counterparts from USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand as well as a few independ-
ent nations in Asia, namely China and the Philippines.42
In the Cold War period and especially since the 1970s, the Japanese were more
interested in the Paciﬁc-rim and, in its extended form, Asia-Paciﬁc cooperation. And in
actuality, such forums including the Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation Council (PECC,
1980) and the Asia-Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation (APEC, 1989) were born through an
intimate collaboration between Japanese and Australian academic, business and politi-
cal elites.43 These architectures seem to have contained, especially in the initial period,
an idea to create a regional cooperation mechanism by developed Paciﬁc-rim powers
(namely Japan and Australia as well as USA and Canada) as the core members while
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involving developing countries as followers or junior partners.
On the other hand, post-war Japanese leaders were rather reluctant vis-a◊-vis the
concept of East Asia regionalism, which would explicitly or tacitly exclude developed
powers other than Japan. One of the reasons behind their reluctance was the stigma of
the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.” Many Japanese almost instinctively
rejected or avoided revoking this memory, especially where Japan would take a lead in
promoting a regional block. Another more important reason was that the Japanese were
worried about the exclusive nature of such an attempt, especially when the United
States disliked this pattern of regional formation.
It is true that Japan had more vested interests in Southeast Asia than the United
States, and she had cultivated very close ties as a dialogue partner with ASEAN since
the early 1970s. But this was purely a relationship of dialogue and negotiation between
Japan on the one hand and Southeast Asian nations as a group on the other, but not the
mechanism within which the both parties would create an exclusively institutionalized
group, much less a regional community of any sort.44
When Japan proposed to ASEAN partners the holding of a special summit to
commemorate the 30th anniversary of ASEAN in 1997, it seemed that she only intended
to enhance the already existing close ties between them. ASEAN’s counter proposal was
however to invite not only Japanese but Chinese and South Korean heads of state to
attend the ASEAN summit as special guests. It is hardly conceivable that the proposers
had a very articulated vision from the start to eventually establish an East Asia
community. But as the ASEAN3 framework became quickly institutionalized, more
and more voices and discourses for such a community started to be widely heard.45
One of the main reasons for this new movement was that the United States did not
strongly oppose to this kind of idea as she had done before, even though her voice of
apprehension was and is heard from time to time. Nevertheless, Japan tried to avoid the
formation of a narrow East Asian regionalism, by strongly supporting the invitation of
Australia and New Zealand as well as India, when ASEAN3 leaders were discussing
about the start of the East Asia Summit. The ﬁrst summit was actually held in Kuala
Lumpur at the end of 2005, with the participation of ASEAN plus six countries, as Japan
had hoped for. The inclusion of “white” countries would dilute the stereotypical image
of the East Asia community as a closed club for yellow people.46
At the same time, it is widely believed that the Japanese strong voice was also
motivated by their hidden agenda to use Australia and India as a counterweight against
the growing presence of China in the regional setting.47 As a matter of fact, China’s
inﬂuence was growing in the Asia-Paciﬁc in general and Southeast Asia in particular.
(2) Japan’s Diplomatic Contest with China
It is really remarkable when one compares China’s current status in the region with
that of just a decade ago. During the early 1990s, China was still regarded with
suspicion by Southeast Asians, even though she had succeeded in the establishment or
restoration of o$cial relations with all of Southeast Asian countries by 1991. The major
sources of their apprehension were that China’s rising economy in itself might turn her
into a formidable competitor, not to also mention security concerns that include her
growing military, especially naval power, and the Spratly issues coupled with her 1992
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adoption of the territorial water law.
However, since the outbreak of the 1997 ﬁnancial crisis, China’s relations with
Southeast Asia was ameliorated and then became increasingly closer. China started to
openly support the idea of regionalism, by becoming a member of the ASEAN3
dialogue and concluding a free trade agreement (FTA) with ASEAN. She also bilater-
ally promoted economic and diplomatic relations with CLMV and Thailand.48
In order to cope with China’s diplomatic o#ensives and her rapidly increasing ties
with Southeast Asia, Japan also started negotiations for an economic partnership
agreement (EPA) with ASEAN as a group and with its members on a bilateral basis. She
also hosted a special summit of ASEAN plus Japan in Tokyo in December 2003.49
In this special summit, the Tokyo Declaration and the Plan of Action were agreed
upon by the participants, and another document was presented by the Tokyo govern-
ment, the title of which was the “New Concept of Mekong Region Development”.50 In
these documents, Japan placed the signiﬁcance of the Mekong sub-regional develop-
ment on the promotion of ASEAN’s integration through a well-balanced development of
its members.
In line with this principle, Prime Minister Koizumi declared in the summit that
Japan would provide 1.5 billion US dollars over a three-year period for the Mekong
sub-region. More precisely, she expressed its preparedness to help the construction of
East-West and Southern Corridors which would connect horizontally continental
Southeast Asian countries. The Tokyo government also promised to support the
activities of IAI and ACMECS, aiming to narrow the development gap through south-to-
south cooperation between the old and new ASEAN members. Japan on the other hand
did not show her willingness to support the building of the North-South Corridor which
would strengthen the vertical linkage between China and continental Southeast Asia.
Two years earlier than the aforementioned summit, a ministerial meeting of the
East-West Corridor was held in Mukdahan in November 2001. Japan was the only
extra-regional invitee to meet Thai, Laotian and Vietnamese counterparts. Taimei
Yamaguchi, parliamentary secretary for foreign a#airs, attended the meeting as the
deputy of Foreign Minister Junko Kawaguchi.51 He stressed the following points in his
speech. The signiﬁcance of Japan’s assistance for the Mekong sub-regional development
was, ﬁrst, its wide-ranging attempt to produce cross-border e#ects and, second, its
contribution to ASEAN integration through narrowing the gap between the new and
old members. In line with this basic understanding, he more concretely explained
Tokyo’s attachment to support the East-West Corridor and Southern Corridor projects
as well as ASEAN’s e#orts for south-to-south cooperation. But he remained quiet as to
any projects related to China such as the North-South Corridor.
More recently, the Japanese government hosted the ﬁrst Japan-Mekong Foreign
Ministers’ Meeting in Tokyo. The idea of the meeting was ﬁrst expressed by Tokyo in
January 2007, when it published a policy paper “Japan-Mekong Region Partnership
Program”.52 The meeting was actually held in January 2008, with the participation of
Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura and his counterparts from ﬁve continental South-
east Asian countries, excluding the Chinese. The timing of the meeting was two months
earlier than that of the third GMS summit in Vientiane where Chinese Prime Minister
Wen Jiabao would meet his counterparts of the CLMV and Thailand.
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In the Tokyo ministerial meeting, Japan repeated her preparedness to support
sub-regional cooperation projects, such as the East-West and Southern Corridors and
the CLV Development Triangle, while all the participants rea$rmed the further deepen-
ing of bilateral and collective partnership between Japan and the sub-regional countries.
They also agreed that 2009 would be the “Japan-Mekong exchange year”.53
The second Japan-Mekong ministerial meeting was held in Siem Reap of Cambodia
in October 2009. The new Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada attended it. Shortly after,
but still within the same month, the ﬁrst Japan-Mekong economic ministers’ meeting
was held in the same place as the ASEAN3 and East Asia Summits, Hua Hinh of
Thailand. Japanese Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry Masayuki Naoshima met
his counterparts from ﬁve continental Southeast Asian countries. Furthermore, as a
highlight of the exchange year, the ﬁrst Japan-Mekong summit will be held as scheduled
in Tokyo in November 2009.54
Thus, partly spurred by the rapidly growing presence of China in the East Asia
region, Japan has become more and more ardent in the Mekong sub-regional develop-
ment, insofar as to promote horizontal connectivity inside continental Southeast Asia.
On the other hand, she remains less active concerning other aspects of the Greater
Mekong sub-regional cooperation, i.e. the enhancement of the vertical linkage between
the southwestern part of China and the continental part of Southeast Asia. Even so, it is
also true that, out of the projects for which Japan has provided ODA to Southeast Asian
countries on a bilateral basis, some have the e#ect of facilitating and enhancing the
connections between China and Southeast Asia as mentioned earlier.
CONCLUSION
(1) From Bilateralism to Multilateralism
Since the end of the Asia-Paciﬁc War, the Indochina peninsula has been often the
testing ground for Japanese diplomacy.
Vietnam was the only case in East Asia where Japan recognized the both govern-
ments of a nation divided by the Cold War confrontation. For the case of China, Japan
severed diplomatic relations with Taipei in 1972 when it o$cially recognized the
Beijing government. For the case of Korea, to this day, Japan hasn’t still established
o$cial relations with Pyongyang.55
South Vietnam was probably the ﬁrst case for post-World WarII Japan where she
had to close down her embassy, facing the abrupt collapse of a government which she
had long recognized as a legitimate ruler of the nation.
Indochina was also the ﬁrst area from which a huge number of refugees arrived in
Japan. The Tokyo government was obliged to accept some of them as permanent
residents. This new policy eventually led to Japan’s belated acceptance of the inter-
national law on refugees and thus brought about signiﬁcant changes in her policies on
immigration and toward foreign residents.
The Paris Peace Conference for Cambodia was the ﬁrst occasion for post-war Japan
to participate in international peace talks as one of the third-party members. Cambodia
was also the ﬁrst country in which post-war Japan sent her army forces abroad.
Indochina was also the sub-region to whose post-war reconstruction Japan showed
her willingness to take a lead to mobilize the international society’s attention and
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support.
Vietnam is the ﬁrst country with which Japan has a joint initiative including an
experimental attempt to go beyond the traditional principle of non-interference in her
ODA policy.
It was the bridge construction project along the GMS East-West Corridor for which
JBIC ﬁnanced yen loans for the ﬁrst time in its history to more than one recipient
country. What is more, the Bank exceptionally o#ered the same conditions for repay-
ment to the countries with di#erent levels of economic development. More generally,
the Mekong sub-region is the test case for Japan to apply a wide-ranging ODA policy
whose beneﬁts are expected to reach the areas beyond national boundaries.
Thus, Japan had a lot of new experiences through accumulated experiments in the
Indochina sub-region in accordance with the changing situation there. One of the
important lessons learnt from the past experiences for Japan might be the necessity to
go beyond traditional bilateralism in her ODA policy. It may be true that many of her
future projects which expect wider-ranging e#ects can be su$ced by the conventional
scheme of ODA on a bilateral basis, but at the same time, there will be an increasing
number of cases in the coming years where such a scheme will no longer be e#ectively
functional. In such cases, Japan may have to introduce a more extensive multilateral
method of ODA spending in place of the present and dominating bilateral mechanism.
For example, Japan will directly deal with multiple recipients for a single project. She
will also increase the ODA budget for inter-governmental organizations and south-to-
south cooperation frameworks.
(2) Contribution to Regional Public Goods
As have been discussed above, Japan’s relations with the Indochina sub-region have
shifted from a stage where she basically followed the US regional strategy, to a stage
where she could have a certain amount of independence and even stay ahead of US
policies. Japan has sometimes tried to play a bridging role between the USA and
Indochinese countries. Furthermore, by the mid-1990s, in order to cope with the new
development in the sub-region, where the third principle of the 1977 Fukuda Doctrine
was proved to be no longer workable, Japan ﬂexibly applied a new policy to support the
process of ASEAN enlargement and integration.
However, since the 199798 regional ﬁnancial crisis, Japan appears to take a more
reactive rather than a proactive attitude toward the rapidly changing situation in East
Asia and Indochina. She is still repeating her e#orts in gap reduction and regional
integration in Southeast Asia as she was doing during the mid-1990s. This suggests
that she has not been successful in ﬁnding a new “philosophy” that would ﬁrmly place
both Japan and Southeast Asia in a single region. She still tends to act as an
extra-regional power that assists countries in a region that she does not belong to.
For one thing, this may be the reﬂection of the fact that Japan’s policy on East Asian
regionalism is still trapped in her self-binding sensitiveness about the rivalry with
China. She has yet to search for a vision that is more suitable for the newly emerging
situation, through such serious and painstaking endeavors to deal with the Indochina or
Greater Mekong sub-region, having been convinced that not only Japan and Southeast
Asia, but China, Korea, and possibly even India are also members of a common
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community.
In other words, even though the 199798 ﬁnancial crisis of East Asia gave an
important momentum for Japanese leaders to realize that the country belonged to a
“region” with closely connected business networks, this kind of notion has not brought
enough conviction for them to fully get involved in a new project of an East Asia-wide
“regionalism”.56 There has been still a strong tendency for Japan to regard herself as an
extra-regional aid-donor and investor to developing countries in Southeast Asia, while
she deals with the East Asia region as a kind of a battle ground where she is competing
with China for the initiative over the still amorphous regionalism.
In August 2003 when Japan published a revised ODA Charter, she a$rmed the
three main objectives: ﬁrst, to serve directly or indirectly her own national interests,
second, to help the recipient nations’ economic growth and better living conditions, and
the third but not the least, to contribute to the International Society.57 If one reﬂects
carefully on the signiﬁcance of the third objective, he would come to the conclusion that
Japan is in a good position to contribute to the common interests of the region which is
not only a part of the global society but a space where herself and her neighbors belong
to. More concretely speaking, it is necessary for Japan to have a clear concept of
regional public goods which should not only be owned and enjoyed by the host
countries, but must be commonly utilized by any member in the region and even out of
it. In the age of regionalism, it is even more necessary to recognize the commonness and
inclusiveness of regional public goods.58
(3) Filling the Missing Link
As pointed out in the preceding paragraphs, one of the most important goals for the
various frameworks related to the Mekong sub-regional cooperation is to create connec-
tivity and well-balanced development.
The connectivity in the sub-regional context can be multifold: the restoration of
linkage between and among nations which had been long separated physically and
psychologically; the transformation of land-locked areas into land-linked areas; the
connection of the hinterlands with the sea outlets; the facilitation of cross-border ﬂow of
goods, people, cars, and information; the enhancement of mutual supplementarity and
synergism in socio-economic development, etc.
Well-balanced development can yield numerous beneﬁts as well. It can literally
narrow the development gap among nations, among provinces, and between urban and
rural sectors. It can contribute to the fair distribution and utilization of limited
resources in the sub-region, among which one of the most important is the water
resource of the Mekong river and its tributaries. It can provide for the sustainability of
development vis-a◊-vis ecological environments, and the well-deliberated e#orts to maxi-
mize the positive aspects of development and minimize and prevent its negative aspects,
among others.
It is of course too ambitious to discuss all of these issues in such a short essay,
therefore at present the author has limited the scope of analysis largely to the connec-
tivity among nations and the shared values in the sub-regional development coopera-
tion.
What the author wishes to add in the ﬁnal part of this essay is the Japanese business
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concerns toward the Mekong sub-region. As the GMS East-West and North-South
transport corridors have taken shape and as the AFTA (ASEAN Free Trade Area) and
the CAFTA (China-ASEAN FTA) process continues, many Japanese business people
have come to regard the dynamism of East Asian economies in a wider context: they
expect the formation of a tripartite linkage among three economies of Japan, Southern
China and continental Southeast Asia.59
Of course the business scene is just as competitive as diplomacy. However, while
business is chieﬂy motivated by proﬁt-making in accordance with market mechanisms,
politicians and diplomats tend to be more concerned about power balance and struggle.
For this reason, the business connection has more room to expand its networks,
regardless of the diplomatic competition and rivalry.
Nevertheless, on the other side of the coin is that business concerns tend to be
concentrated in economic centers in Canton, Bangkok and to a lesser extent in
Hochiminh City and Hanoi-Hai Phong, where industrial clusters have been or are being
established. Their attention is almost always placed on the ﬂow of products between
and among these economic centers. In another words, many localities in-between are
generally left out of their concerns. It is rather natural though for business to work in
accordance with market mechanisms.
For a well-balanced development, nevertheless, it is indispensable to think about
the socio-economic progress of areas in-between, including the Central Highlands of
Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Northeastern Thailand and Myanmar. And it is initially the
responsibility of politicians and government o$cials to undertake this task. The
Japanese government is strongly expected to make even further e#orts by collaborating
with host governments as well as other donors and stake holders, to support the smooth
and steady development of these localities in ﬁelds such as institutional reform, human
resource development, capacity building and information proliferation, as well as hard
infrastructure building.
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